Incepusem sa discut in partea I datoria externa a Romaniei, starnit de o afirmatie facuta de Gheorghe Funar cum ca aceasta ar fi ajuns la 140 de miliarde de euro. Desi ar trebui sa reiasa din episodul anterior, aici ajungem la o oarecare concluzie in aceasta privinta.

Un exemplu (de evitat) de reactie in genul celei vanate de dl Funar este reactia grecilor. Economistul ne felicita in felul sau tocilar:

There is a striking contrast between riots in Greece and the grim patience of ex-communist voters, whose living standards have plunged amid soaring unemployment. The “institutional fragility” that some west European politicians worried about may be a genuine problem—but in the euro area, not in eastern Europe.

De ce sa ne oprim cu comparatiile la Portugalia? Iata cum se compara Europa de Est cu America Latina, care a avut probleme serioase cu datoria de-a lungul timpului (cf Economist):

Suma de 140 de miliarde de euro pare insa uriasa pentru economia romaneasca chiar in conditiile de criza pe care trecem. Este cu atat mai ingrijoratoare cu cat Romania a refuzat sa se imprumute la dobanda de 8% ceruta de pietele de capital, amanand contractarea acestei datorii pentru luna Noiembrie, cand va avea mai putine optiuni si cand, daca lucrurile merg mai prost, vom fi complet la cheremul investitorilor streini de neam si tara. Daca insa incercam sa verificam datele d-lui Funar cu datele publicate de Banca Nationala a Romaniei, descoperim ca datoria externa se situeaza in jurul cifrei de 90 de miliarde de euro:

Datoria externa a României la 31 mai 2010 si serviciul datoriei externe în perioada ianuarie-mai 2010

Probabil ca dl Funar gandeste in lei dar se exprima in euro. Uuuf! Rasuflu usurat!

Probabil ca dl Funar nu are nevoie sa fie corect, scopul sau fiind de a “destepta romanul” si inima sa ca sa “treaca batalioanele Carpatii”, nu sa apeleze la intelect cu date si cifre. Economistul, pe de alta parte, citeaza EBRD in ce priveste 4 arii care necesita imbunatatiri in Europa de Est:

1. sistemul legal: legea contractului si dreptul de proprietate nu par a fi intelese de toata lumea (sa ne mai miram ca tiganii nu le au la capitolul asta?)
2. birocratia: desi simplificat, birocratia excesiva si non-standard continua sa scoata peri albi investitorilor
3. ajutorul de stat: sentimentul ca bogatii continua sa se-mbogateasca in timp ce “oamenii cinstiti” saracesc si o iau in mana trebuie atacat
4. competitia: bariere informale si sistemul PCR, strain strainilor, trebuie spart

Dar acestea sunt probleme bine-cunoscute la care lucram cam cu acelasi spor ca la autostrazi. Interbarea e ce ne facem daca nu reusim sa strangem banii necesari? Ideea falimentului n-ar trebui sa sperie. Nu toate tarile falite au ajuns bine, dar sunt cateva care, conform Economistului, au iesit mai proaspete din buda:

All too often in history countries have been allowed to become serial defaulters without suffering that much in the way of penalty. In “This Time Is Different”, their book on financial crises, Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff point out that Spain defaulted seven times in the 19th century and Portugal six. In the 20th century, European nations (including Russia) managed 16 defaults between them.

A more subtle way of getting rid of at least part of your foreign debt is to allow your currency to depreciate. This option is only available to the likes of America and Britain, which have been allowed to borrow in their domestic currencies and seem already to be exploiting this fact.

Creditors used to be alive to these dangers and insisted on international agreements that required countries to safeguard the value of their currencies. But this is mainly a world of floating exchange rates. Combine these with democracy and countries have a licence to abuse foreign creditors. They have always had the motive to do so. The credit crunch has given them the opportunity.

Bine-bine, astea-s povesti vechi, n-ai date mai noi si mai relevante, Economistule?

For a start, what is so bad about default and restructuring? In the 1990s Russia restructured $32 billion worth of Soviet debt into PRINs and IANs (both are now stored in the Museum of Financial Archaeology and may be viewed on application to the curator). In 1998 it defaulted on those debt instruments. People said Russia’s financial credibility would never recover. One banker said he would rather eat nuclear waste than invest in Russia again. But within a couple of years, Russia was flavour of the month.
Relics of restructurings past

It was the same story with Poland, which restructured its debt after 1989. Thanks to heavy politicking from America, the freely elected authorities were allowed to swap sovereign debt incurred by the communist regime into less onerous “Brady bonds” (stored in the same museum, also viewable on application). Hungary, which did not have the same backing from America, has had to pay its debt in full. That depressed its growth rate in the 1990s and meant lower government spending and higher taxes. Hungary should have benefited from this sacrifice by gaining a better credit rating. It didn’t. Funny things, markets.

The moral is that investors’ memories are short. If Greece were to restructure its debt, it would not take long for greed to trump fear and for capital to start flowing again.

De unde se vede ca “invatati, invatati si iar invatati” a devenit “imprumutati, imprumutati si iar imprumutati” ca B.L.L.L. curge!!!

Economist articles: ec-dogma, ec-dd, ec-la, ec-banks, ec-iceland, ec-fingered

PDF Docs: [Lista datoriilor externe] [Romania's External Debt Sustainability Under Crisis Circumstances] [current acct deficits and risk] [Romania public debts and their consequences upon the economy] [Rel between public and external debt] [Impact of global crisis on Romania Dev] [Romania: Deep Recession, Reduced External Imbalances] [Euro area and EU27 government deficit at 6.3% and 6.8% of GDP] [Odious Debt by Seema Jayachandran and Michael Kremer]